

DDA Registry

DDA 77-3444

Executive	Security
77-1531/3	

14 June 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: John F. Blake  
Deputy Director for Administration

SUBJECT: Security Review Report  
(Moore and Boyce/Lee Cases) (U)

Hank:

1. (U/AIUO) I have reviewed the White Book and talked to Bob Gambino concerning the Director's marginal comments. As a result, I have instructed Bob to formalize the Director's taskings with regard to those items he approved. These items will be incorporated into a memorandum and forwarded to the DCI for his formal approval. In this manner we will have an inclusive document which will be available for ready reference.

2. (S) With respect to the actions the Office of Security can initiate, I have asked Bob to immediately undertake such action. Some of these actions involving the codeword area will result in a paper being written for the Director's signature directing certain initiatives by the Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Community and Director, NRO.

3. (U/AIUO) I also requested Bob to price out manpower and dollars required to implement the actions which the DCI has already approved. I asked Bob to write this memorandum in such a way as to permit us to use it as a tasking on the Comptroller to make the positions and funds available.

4. (U/AIUO) Finally, since the Director did not comment one way or the other on the recommendations concerning the polygraph, I have requested Bob to write a separate paper to him addressing the industrial polygraph program and other related polygraph matters.

John F. Blake

Distribution:

Original - DDCI

1 - ER

1 - D/Security

E2 IMPDET

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Copy 1 of 9

10 MAY 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
VIA: Deputy Director for Administration  
FROM: Robert W. Gambino  
Director of Security  
SUBJECT: Key Recommendations — Security Review  
of the Impact of the Moore and Boyce/Lee  
Cases

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1. Action Requested: This memorandum forwards the report of the Security Review Task Force studying the impact of the Moore and Boyce/Lee cases and requests your approval to implement within the jurisdiction of the Central Intelligence Agency certain key recommendations of the Task Force. Identification of these recommendations is contained in paragraph 3.

2. Background: A Security Review Task Force was established by me in early March 1977 to study the impact of the Moore and Boyce/Lee cases and to offer recommendations to correct any security deficiencies it might identify in the course of its study. Between mid-March and late April the Task Force interviewed knowledgeable individuals in industry and government and visited industrial sites in pursuit of its objective. While the efforts of the group were not totally exhaustive, e.g. neither Boyce nor Lee has been debriefed in depth, I believe that the results of the Task Force effort represent a valuable product; while many of the recommendations need further analysis, they do indeed focus on security policies and procedures in the Agency; in industry, and in the Community which need strengthening.

Although in most respects the Moore case, involving an older, retired staff employee of the Agency, and the

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WARNING NOTICE  
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES  
AND METHODS

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Control System Only

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E-2 IMPDET  
CL BY [REDACTED]

4 June 1977

NOTE FOR: DDCI

Hank -

1. DCI has read the Office of Security "Security Review Report" (Moore and Boyce/Lee) and now requests a "fault-finding review". Attached is his memo to you and a copy of each page of the report on which he made comment.

2. As you know, OS is conducting now the requested review of OS does not believe it should investigate its own performance and I agree. Recommend you assign this to the IG.

3. Problems:

a. DCI has approved some recommendations without regard to resource implications.

b. Action on some items such as the six-month moratorium on access approvals applied to each contractor and government agency (page 20-21), and the DCI Security Committee review of DCID 1/14 (page 193) should probably be initiated via the IC Staff.

c. The DCI has taken no action on the recommendation to institute a program of selective polygraphs in private industry, which OS regards as the heart of its reform program - if we are to weed out the future Boyces.

4. I suggested to ADDA and D/OS that they prepare an action plan for you, noting where further guidance is required and those items on which action should be given to the IC Staff.

A/DDCI

Re paragraph two recommendation:

Approve: B/  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

6/6/77  
Date

Disapprove: \_\_\_\_\_  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

\_\_\_\_\_  
Date

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MR. GAMBINO

OD/A Registry

12 JUN 1977

17 3/50

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence  
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence  
SUBJECT: Security Review Report (Moore and Boyce/Lee Cases)

25X1A 1. I have just read in some detail the Security Review Task Force Report on the Moore and Boyce/Lee Cases. To begin with, let me commend [REDACTED] and his Task Force for a thorough and constructive job. I have annotated the Task Force's recommendations and request that you proceed expeditiously with those for which I have indicated approval. The others are not disapproved, but I will await further staffing and recommendation from you before proceeding with them.

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[REDACTED]

any other [REDACTED]

3. With respect to CIA's involvement, we should look at what our regulations require of our Office of Security and whether they were in fact fulfilled. I recall receiving a memorandum on this case some months ago in which it was clearly stated that some major required inspections by the Office of Security were not conducted in connection with this case.

[REDACTED]  
STANSFIELD TURNER

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DDA 77-1220

Executive Registry
77-3624

3 MAR 1977

DD/A Registry  
File *Security*

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence  
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence  
SUBJECT: Polygraph Testing

1. I have reviewed the package you sent me on the question of polygraph testing. I would appreciate the following backup information:

a. Of the samples indicated, a large percentage of new applicants were rejected on the basis of polygraph alone. Were the additional forms of investigation, such as interviews with friends, completed or was the applicant rejected on the basis of polygraph before the testing went forward? What did the polygraph show and how did we know it was a clear-cut case for rejection?

b. In the two test cases cited, what was the questioning like? What checks do we have to prevent the questionable and embarrassing interrogation techniques (e.g., questions on sexual behavior) that [REDACTED] alleges were formerly used?

2. Would you give me a simple statement in layman's language summarizing the generally accepted view of the validity of polygraph techniques. What standards do the many agencies that use the polygraph use to measure the reliability of a polygraph test?

[REDACTED]  
STANSFIELD TURNER  
Admiral, U.S. Navy

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<b>TRANSMITTAL SLIP</b>		DATE
TO: Memo for Record		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	
REMARKS:  D/OS, Mr. Gambino advised on 14 March, that he had furnished the appropriate backup information directly to Mr. Knoche--no DDA copy.  Del/14 March		
FROM:		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION

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STATINTL

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S E C R E T

*3 March 77*

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : E. H. Knoche  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Polygraph Testing

REFERENCE : Your Memorandum dated 3 March 1977

1. This memorandum is for your information and contains a brief overview of our polygraph program as it relates to the several questions you posed in Reference. Also, you will find attached for your perusal documents which in sum give a more detailed statement on our program. These may add to your understanding of how the Central Intelligence Agency utilizes this valuable investigative tool.

2. This Agency has utilized the polygraph in its security screening process since 1949. Security information on applicants is derived from two processes; the polygraph interview and a full field investigation. A security decision to approve or disapprove an applicant is based on this total package. In a preponderance of routine applicant cases (approximately 95 per cent), the field investigation is completed prior to the polygraph interview. Though derogatory information may be developed in either process, both are usually brought to completion prior to adjudication. The entire package is considered in the adjudicative process with final authority for security disapproval limited to the Director of Security. This authority may not be delegated. The investigator and the polygraph examiner play no part in the adjudicative process. Disapprovals based on the polygraph result from substantive information supplied by the polygraph Subject during the interview process. A security disapproval would never be based solely on the physiological evidence derived from polygraph testing.

S E C R E T

CLASSIFIED BY Signer  
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION  
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652 EX-  
EMPTION CATEGORY (1), (2), (3) or (4)  
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON  
\_\_\_\_\_  
(effective date or event, if any)



S E C R E T

5. Attached, you will find lists of the pertinent questions asked during the polygraph processing of applicants. These represent the sum total of security issues covered during polygraph testing of applicants. In consideration of an individual's right to privacy, any additional questions asked during the interview are limited to those relevant to these issues. Specifically, no questions are asked concerning Subject's sexual behavior except as required to resolve issues concerning homosexual conduct or major sexual criminal acts. The examiner is enjoined against pursuing any topic unless it obviously relates to one of these standard questions. The Director of Security has established adequate safeguards designed to prevent unwarranted invasions of privacy. In this regard, an examiner's handbook sets forth policy guidance explaining how examiners are to interpret the intent of the standard questions which relate to relevant security issues. Additionally, polygraph interviews are monitored by supervisory personnel randomly. The entire completed polygraph case is reviewed by two levels of management: the desk supervisor and the Chief or Deputy Chief, Polygraph Branch.

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[REDACTED]

... in the context presented, absolutely false. The only areas of sexual behavior considered to be security issues are homosexual conduct and criminal sexual behavior. It is possible but far from routine that an applicant may manifest anxieties due to concerns in other sexual areas which require discussion to resolve test responses to questions on these issues. In all such cases, the Subject is advised that these topics have no bearing on his employment with the Central Intelligence Agency, are not reported, and are not pursued without his voluntary participation.

5. Validity, the degree to which a polygraph test measures what it purports to measure, is difficult to evaluate. Real life examples are scarce and laboratory experiments lack real life conditions. Recent validity and reliability research conducted by a major university concludes that the accuracy of polygraph examination is

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

approximately 90 per cent. Validity in the sense of utility is easily demonstrated by the fact that 60 per cent of security disapprovals have resulted from substantive information provided by Subjects during polygraph interviews from 1963-1974. Reliability, the consistency of interpretation of polygraph tests by the examiners, has been studied and it has been determined that the reliability is high and compares favorably with, for example, medical doctors interpreting the electrocardiogram. Only one other Agency in the federal government, the National Security Agency, uses the polygraph as a screening device. The National Security Agency undertook a detailed reliability study in the early 1960's which demonstrated a reliability of the polygraph at 95 per cent. All other Agencies utilizing the polygraph use it to specific ends: i.e., resolution of allegations, criminal activity, etc., which applications do not equate to our applicant processing. As a matter of policy, the Central Intelligence Agency does not utilize the polygraph in administrative or official matters involving possible malfeasance or for the sole purpose of determining violations of criminal law of any country.

6. Over the years, we have conducted attitudinal surveys of several thousand persons tested which indicate that the polygraph in this Agency is favorably accepted by Agency personnel as a viable and pertinent part of our screening process.

/s/  
E. H. Knoche

Attachments:

- A. Ltr to Honorable Bella Abzug fr DCI dtd 25 Feb 1976
- B. Use of polygraph by CIA
- C. Memo to D/Security from Director Helms dtd 21 Feb 1970

Distribution:

- Original - Addressee
- 1 - DDCI
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- 1 - D/Security

ORIGINATOR:

Robert W. Gambino  
Director of Security

MAR 1977  
Date

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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

76-6596/1

OLC 76-0273/a

25 FEB 1976

Honorable Bella S. Abzug, Chairwoman  
Subcommittee on Government Information and  
Individual Rights  
Committee on Government Operations  
House of Representatives  
Washington, D. C. 20515

Dear Madame Chairwoman:

This is in reply to your letter of 29 January 1976 submitting a copy of the report of the Committee on Government Operations, House Report 94-795, entitled "The Use of Polygraph and Similar Devices by Federal Agencies" and requesting certain comments concerning the Agency's continued use of the polygraph.

If legislation was enacted to prohibit the use of the polygraph by all government agencies for all purposes as recommended on page 46 of the report, it would seriously impair the Director of Central Intelligence from complying with his statutory responsibility under the National Security Act of 1947. I refer to Section 102(d)(3) of the Act which makes the Director responsible for the protection of intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. An effective personnel security program is vital to assure this protection.

STATINTL The polygraph is an integral and essential part of security processing to determine the security eligibility of persons for Agency employment [REDACTED] As statistics illustrate, during the period 1963 through mid-1974, of those applicants for employment rejected on security grounds, over 60 percent were rejected on the basis of information developed principally or solely during polygraph interviews. In a sampling of recent records, about half of the applicants who had been disapproved on the basis of information developed during polygraph interviews had already completed all other security screening and been provisionally approved on this basis. Without the polygraph program, the disqualifying information on these cases would have remained unknown. In addition, it is reasonable to presume that the program is a significant deterrent to application for employment by unsuitable candidates, and, more importantly, penetration attempts by foreign intelligence services.



The utility of CIA's polygraph program is not solely a function of its part in contributing information leading to the rejection of unsuitable candidates. The preponderance of polygraph interview reports are favorable. Most of these favorable reports constitute useful and comforting confirmation of other screening procedures; the remainder represent favorable resolutions of allegations or suspicions which otherwise could result in injustices or in unnecessary defensive measures.

The Central Intelligence Agency has consistently urged continuance of its polygraph program in its reports to congressional committees on proposed legislation and hearings concerning the polygraph. We note in the Dissenting Views of your report, on page 56, that on 25 March 1975, based on the hearings held in 1974, that the Subcommittee initially approved a recommendation which would have prohibited the use of the polygraph in all but cases involving national security and for law enforcement purposes provided fifth amendment rights under the Constitution were not violated. This concern for national security was recognized by former Senator Sam Ervin, a strong advocate of individual rights, though he otherwise objected to the use of the polygraph. In his proposed legislation to protect the personal privacy of government employees, introduced during several Congresses prior to his retirement from public office, Senator Ervin expressly excepted the CIA and the National Security Agency from the provision barring the use of the polygraph in Government. Senator Ervin's last bill was S. 1688, Senate Report 93-724, which passed the Senate 7 March 1974.

The CIA is cognizant of the danger of abuse inherent in the use of any instrument used to aid in distinguishing truths from untruths. Consequently, we have adopted strict procedures to prevent abuses and to protect those taking the examination. These include:

- notification to each applicant for employment at the time he is given an application form of the intent to use a polygraph examination in the course of his employment processing;

- coordination with the Office of Personnel and the Office of Medical Services to determine if a polygraph interview is advisable;

- advance written consent of the applicant;

- notification of the privilege against self-incrimination on questions pertaining to violations of criminal law;

- reviewing all questions with the applicant before testing;
- limiting questions to those exclusively related to security issues;
- informing the applicant that the examination may be monitored and possibly recorded to let him know there are no hidden procedures;
- random monitoring by a specialized supervisor to insure that no improper questions are asked;
- maintenance of polygraph records in separate files with very strict need-to-know rules governing access;
- prohibition of release of polygraph-acquired information outside the Agency without my approval or that of the Deputy Director and only if such a release is necessary in the interest of national security;
- the polygraph examiner makes no recommendation as to the security suitability of the person tested; and
- evaluation of the polygraph report is but one element in the total personnel security screening program.

With respect to reliability, defined in accordance with scientific convention as the consistency of the interpretations of the polygraph charts, agreement studies were conducted as part of an Agency research program which was initiated partially in response to the hearings held by the Foreign Operations and Government Information Subcommittee in the early 1960's. Numerical results of these studies are complex and would require extensive explanation, but comparisons may be useful. Comparable studies of similar professional groups are scarce but two were found, involving cardiologists evaluating EKG charts for cardiac pathology and psychologists evaluating MMPI test results for psychopathology. The CIA polygraphers' chart interpretations were as good as or better than these two groups.

Finally, the selection of polygraph officers is extremely discriminating as to their qualifications, intelligence, integrity, and high character. They are given a rigorous training program which is a continuing process to keep them abreast of developments in their professional field. CIA has maintained a vigorous research effort inquiring into new techniques and equipment to insure that the highest standards are maintained.

ER

ER  
FEB 25  
In view of my statutory responsibility to protect intelligence sources and methods and the proven reliability of the polygraph and the safeguards in its utilization, I must disagree with the recommendation of the Committee. This Agency's personnel security standards must be maintained at the highest levels. Termination of the Agency's polygraph program would increase its vulnerability to hostile penetration and would seriously impact on the Agency's effectiveness in carrying out its foreign intelligence collection mission.

Sincerely,

/s/ George Bush

George Bush  
Director

cc:

Chairman, House Government Operations Committee

Distribution:

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- 1 - DCI
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STATINTL OLC/PLC/dlw [REDACTED] (20 Feb. 1976)

FEB 26 8 07 AM '76

ER






**ADMINISTRATIVE-INTERNAL USE ONLY**

1. Use of the polygraph by the Central Intelligence Agency is guided by the directive from the Director/CIA to the Director of Security dated 21 February 1970. The terms of this directive are as follows:

The Director of Security is responsible for the supervision and training of polygraph examiners and for the conduct of the polygraph program of the CIA. He is charged by the DCI with the responsibility of insuring that the highest standards of operating procedures and equipment capability are established.

The polygraph is used in the CIA as an aid to investigation for determining the security eligibility of persons for employment by or assignment to the Agency; staff-like access to sensitive Agency installations; utilizations in  or continued access to classified information where implications of a security nature or investigative information require clarifying security interviews.

The polygraph is not used on official or administrative matters involving possible malfeasance, or for the sole purpose of determining violations of the criminal laws of any

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## ADMINISTRATIVE-INTERNAL USE ONLY

If a polygraph examination involved a question pertaining to the violation of a criminal law, the individual would be informed of his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to consult with legal counsel or other professional assistance prior to the examination. Notification of such rights would be formally recorded.

Each applicant for employment is notified, at the time he is given application forms, of the intent to use a polygraph examination in the course of his employment processing. A copy of this form is attached (Tab A).

He is told, before testing, the general content of all questions which he will be asked. The questions, since they are couched in broad terms, are discussed carefully with the applicant and the examiner works with the applicant to tailor the questions to his/her age, sex, and background. All the testing procedures are explained. Questions were revised in 1974. A copy of the current questions is attached (Tab B).

Before a person undergoes a polygraph examination, his consent is obtained in writing. A copy of the form is attached (Tab C). Polygraph

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examinations are not given to CIA applicants under the age of 18.

The applicant is told that the polygraph examination may be monitored or recorded. This provision was incorporated into the Polygraph Agreement Form in 1974.

Before an applicant is polygraphed, he has been interviewed by representatives of the Office of Personnel and Office of Medical Services. A security field investigation has also been initiated. Guidance from the Office of Personnel and the Medical Staff is routinely provided to the Office of Security if any information has been developed as a result of their screening procedures that might preclude the advisability of conducting a polygraph interview.

The Director of Security is responsible for establishment of adequate safeguards designed to prevent unwarranted invasion of privacy.

All questions must have specific relevance to the person being polygraphed, and to the purpose of that particular test.

Examiner's instructions have been prepared in sensitive question areas to ensure that persons undergoing polygraph interrogation

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are not subjected to questioning about irrelevant, unwarranted, or trivial matters. The interview is not used to probe a person's thoughts about conduct which has no security implications; e.g., religious beliefs, practices, and affiliations, opinions regarding racial matters; political activities or organizational affiliations of a nonsubversive nature; and personal views concerning proposed or existing legislation. Examiners have been furnished a copy of policy guidelines explaining how they are to interpret the intent of the questions.

The Director of Security maintains separate files for information obtained during polygraph examinations. These files are kept separate from Security files as well as separate from Personnel files. Polygraph information is released only to appropriate Agency officials when it has a direct bearing on a decision to be made by that official.

Polygraph-acquired information can only be released outside the Agency after a determination has been made, which is approved by the

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ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY

Director or Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, that such a release is necessary and in compliance with existing regulations.

2. CIA polygraph examinations fall into two major categories: Applicant entry-on-duty for staff-like access to sensitive installations [REDACTED] in support of requirements of the Deputy Director for

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[REDACTED]

citizens and include:

- a. Staff Applicants
- b. Staff Contract Employees
- c. Consultants
- d. Staff Co-op and Summer Intern Candidates
- e. Military Assignees (occupying a CIA billet)
- f. Military and Civilian Detailees (attached to CIA but occupying a billet of their parent organization)
- g. Contractor and Independent Vendor Personnel

3. Questions of the effectiveness and reliability of polygraphy are highly complex and difficult to answer both briefly and meaningfully -- the figures vary with the definitions of terms, the formats of the tests, and the situation: e.g., field vs. laboratory, specific issue vs. screening. We offer some samples

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## ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY

of data from the Agency's research program, initiated partially in response to the 1963 hearings conducted by the Foreign Operations and Government Information Subcommittee of the House Government Operations Committee.

4. Of 827 applicant cases studied, 130 or 16 percent were rejected for employment, In the rejected population, the basis for rejection was:

Polygraph Alone	74%
Polygraph Plus Other	10%
Medical Alone	8%
Personnel Alone	4%
Field Check Alone	4%

5. In a separate study conducted by the Office of Security, 214 consecutive cases processed through both the polygraph and standard investigative checks were reviewed to determine the reliability and accuracy of the polygraph report content. The study verified that polygraph reports were primarily concerned with security information. Of that 214, there were 36 employment rejections (17%), 24 (12%) of which were rejected for security reasons. The 24 adverse security decisions were based on information acquired from:

Polygraph Alone	79%
Polygraph Plus	
Investigative Check	8%
Investigative Check Alone	13%

6. Based on the above figures, it can be said that the polygraph examination plays a strong role in the

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Agency's personnel security system. The comparability of the rejection figures (and reasons for rejection) in the two separate samples indicate relative stability and, therefore, presumed objectivity.

7. With respect to reliability, defined in accordance with scientific convention as the consistency of repeatability of interpretation of the polygraph charts, agreement studies were conducted as a part of this same research program. Numerical results of these studies are complex and would require extensive explanation, but comparisons may be useful. Comparable studies of similar professional groups are scarce, but two were found, involving cardiologists evaluating EKG charts for cardiac pathology and psychologists evaluating MMPI test results for psychopathology. The CIA polygraphers' chart interpretations were as good as or better than these two groups.

8. The Agency's orientation in this research has been toward identifying weaknesses and improving the process; but if a judgment is to be made along the way, we regard the findings as indicating that the polygraph interview, as employed in CIA, is an effective and useful component of the Agency's screening process.

9. Attached is a copy (Tab D) of statements made by a senior representative of the Central Intelligence Agency

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before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations and Government Information in June 1974. Included in these statements is additional information concerning the Agency's polygraph research program.

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WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

Applicant Information  
Sheet No. 2

1. In accordance with its special national responsibilities, the Central Intelligence Agency is obliged to judge carefully the suitability of each person selected for employment in the Agency. To assist in this determination, an extensive investigation, which includes a polygraph interview, is conducted with regard to the loyalty, background, and character of applicants under consideration for employment with the Agency. This investigation includes, but is not limited to, inquiries concerning:

- a. professional competence
- b. any behavior, activities or associations which tend to show that the individual is of questionable character, discretion, integrity or trustworthiness
- c. any deliberate misrepresentations, falsifications, or omission of material facts
- d. any criminal, infamous, dishonest, immoral, or notoriously disgraceful conduct, habitual use of intoxicants to excess, drug use or abuse, or sexual perversion
- e. physical fitness
- f. an adjudication of insanity, serious mental illnesses, neurological disorders, or emotional instability
- g. any facts which furnish reason to believe that the individual may be subjected to coercion, influence, or pressure which may cause him to act contrary to the best interests of the national security
- h. commission of any act of sabotage, espionage, treason, or sedition, or attempts thereat or preparation therefor, or conspiring with, or aiding or abetting, another to commit or attempt to commit any act of sabotage, espionage, treason, or sedition
- i. establishing or continuing a sympathetic association with a saboteur, spy, traitor, seditionist, anarchist, or revolutionist, or with an espionage or other secret agent or representative of a foreign nation, or any representative of a foreign nation whose interests may be inimical to the interests of the United States, or with any person who advocates the use of force or violence to overthrow the government of the United States or the alteration of the form of government of the United States by unconstitutional means

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States, or of the alteration of the form of government of the United States by unconstitutional means

- k. membership in, or affiliation or sympathetic association with, any foreign or domestic organization, movement, group, or combination of persons which is totalitarian, Fascist, Communist, or subversive, or which has adopted, or shows, a policy of advocating or approving the commission of acts of force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States, or which seeks to alter the form of government of the United States by unconstitutional means
- l. intentional, unauthorized disclosure to any person of security information, or of other information, disclosure of which is prohibited by law, or willful violation or disregard of security regulations
- m. performing or attempting to perform his duties, or otherwise acting, so as to serve the interests of another government in preference to the interests of the United States

2. The Central Intelligence Agency's standards require strict interpretation of the above and other relevant factors in considering applicants for employment. In the event an applicant is in doubt as to whether anything in his background may disqualify him, he is at liberty to describe the matter in writing, place it in an envelope bearing only his name and marked "CONFIDENTIAL DISCLOSURE" and forward it with his application.

TAB B

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TAB C



## POLYGRAPH AGREEMENT

I, \_\_\_\_\_, an applicant for employment with the Central Intelligence Agency, understand that the Agency uses Polygraph testing as a routine procedure and that every employee of the Agency will be requested to participate in Polygraph tests from time to time. Having been informed of my rights under the Constitution, I agree, of my own free will and without any compulsion, duress, or promise of reward or immunity, to an interview with officials of the Central Intelligence Agency, during which I will participate in Polygraph tests. I consent to the monitoring and recording of these tests for the purpose of accuracy.

I have read the foregoing and fully understand its import.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I place my signature below, this \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_ 19\_\_\_\_.

\_\_\_\_\_  
Signature

The above was read and signed in my presence this \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_ 19\_\_\_\_.

\_\_\_\_\_  
Signature

TAB D



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DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR MANAGEMENT AND -

SERVICES, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Mr. Brownman. Yes, I appreciate that, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Moorhead. The direct testimony will be in open session, it will be only the question and answer period when we will go into executive session.

And actually, Mr. Brownman, could you summarize your statement? We are running out of time.

Mr. Brownman. Before I go to the formal statement, I would like to take the opportunity to set the record straight, if I may.

On the 17th of April we informed this Committee, in response to its questionnaire, that the CIA did not possess and did not use psychological stress evaluators. We assumed by that phrase that you were referring to the general field of voice analysis. To keep the record straight, on the 24th of May 1974 this agency procured a [REDACTED] STATINTL

from [REDACTED] We are looking at this device prior to a firm decision as to whether to engage in any serious research.

Mr. Moorhead. It is good to have the record clear.

Mr. Brownman. If you would to speed this up I can summarize it.

Mr. Moorhead. If you want to make a particular point,

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1 go ahead.

2 Mr. Brownman. There are a couple of particular points.  
3 And let me take them very rapidly.

4 Mr. Moorhead. And without objection the entire state-  
5 ment will be made part of the record.

6 Mr. Brownman. That will be excellent, sir.

7 (Showing chart)


8 This is a bar chart which shows a bit of history over  
9 the last ten years. It is interesting to note -- let's take  
10 the year 1964 as a specific example--court disapprovals for  
11 staff employment numbered 152 in that year. Of the 152 134  
12 were either triggered by or totally substantiated by the use  
13 of polygraph. And that pattern is throughout the period of  
14 time. This is one of the types of research study that we  
15 continue to perform in the agency both directly in the agency  
16 and with a contractor, to evaluate our results and see if we  
17 see any trends. And I believe the key point that this chart  
18 shows is that the polygraph is a very useful adjunct to the  
19 security screening process for staff employment at the CIA.

20 Mr. Phillips. Mr. Chairman, could that chart be made a  
21 part of the record. I think it would be very useful to our  
22 study.

23 Mr. Moorhead. Can you do that?

24 Mr. Brownman. Yes, sir.

25 Mr. Moorhead. Without objection it will be done.

**SECURITY DISAPPROVALS OF APPLICANTS****POLYGRAPH**

1 Mr. Brownman. As a key point, and being sensitive to  
2 some of the questions I heard previously, the issue about  
3 polygraph records, after the completion of the polygraph  
4 examination, these are maintained as security record. These  
5 are not included in the security file of the individual, pass  
6 or fail, they are separate and isolated records.

7 They are not now, nor are they contemplated to be,  
8 put into any computer storage device. And they are only re-  
9 ferred to under unusual and extreme cases by an individual who  
10 has a specific operational purpose, and must be approved by  
11 the Director of Central Intelligence or the Deputy Director of  
12 Central Intelligence.

13 Another key item that I would like to stress is that in  
14 the framing of the questions for the polygraph examination we  
15 do take cognizance of age of the individual, sex, as well as  
16 some of the background material.

17 Before a person undergoes a polygraph examination his  
18 consent is obtained in writing. If an applicant asks, he is  
19 told if the polygraph examination is being monitored or  
20 recorded. Ocaasionally we will record or monitor a poly-  
21 graph examination, and I might say that if the applicant is  
22 a female, and the examiner is a male, we almost always record  
23 the examination.

24 The individual, prior to being polygraphed, has been  
25 interviewed by the Office of Personnel, the Offices of Medical  
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1 Services, and a major portion of the background investigation  
2 has been completed.

3 As a matter of fact, the background investigation could  
4 lead to specific questions on the polygraph examination where  
5 clarity or confirmation is required.

6 The examiner's instructions have been prepared in  
7 sensitive question, areas to ensure that persons undergoing  
8 polygraph interrogation are not subjected to questioning  
9 about irrelevant, unwarranted or trivial matters. The in-  
10 terview is not used to probe a person's thoughts about  
11 conduct which he has no security implications, for example, re-  
12 ligious beliefs, practices and affiliations, opinions regarding  
13 racial matters, political activities, or organizational affili-  
14 ations of a non-subversive nature -- and since last night, I  
15 might add, one wonders what that means -- and personal views  
16 concerning proposed or existing legislation.

17 I feel it appropriate here to make three basic points.  
18 The polygraph examiner makes no recommendation as to the  
19 security, suitability or status of the person tested. The  
20 polygraph report is evaluated as but one element of the  
21 total investigative record. At no time is security action  
22 taken solely on the basis of the polygraph chart.

23 About the research program, we have a very aggressive  
24 research program. I think I might read this.

25 Moving from procedures into the research area, you

1 recall that one of this Committee's primary recommendations  
2 was that a program of research on polygraph be undertaken to  
3 investigate the validity and reliability of the procedure.  
4 We are conducting such a program.

5 Reliability, defined as consistency of interpretation  
6 of polygraph charts, has been looked at by means of examiner  
7 agreement studies. Agreement figures from our studies are  
8 comparable to figures from similar studies of other  
9 groups interpreting data germane to their specialties.

10 On the other hand, validity -- or the degree to which  
11 polygraph charts measure what they purport to measure -- has  
12 been a more difficult issue to evaluate. Satisfactory in-  
13 dependent criteria for validating real life conditions are  
14 scarce, and the differences in polygraph subject attitudes  
15 between real life and laboratory conditions have prevented  
16 much headway through laboratory experiments. The data so  
17 far available have not been disappointing, but they are limited,  
18 and we still lack an appropriate scientific base for any con-  
19 clusions.

20 We also investigated validity in the sense of utility--  
21 the degree to which the polygraph program does what it is  
22 intended to do. As you can see from this chart, in each year  
23 since 1964 a significant number of security disapprovals of  
24 applicants who were processed to the point of the polygraph  
25 interview has been due to the polygraph portion of our

1 security processing.

2       Alternative sensors have been evaluated -- for example,  
3 a more sophisticated electrodermal sensor; impedance rather  
4 than mechanical sensors; electromyography; electroencephalo-  
5 graphy; microvibration; electrooculography; pulse-wave  
6 velocity; and cardiostachometry. We can generally state that  
7 while many of these alternatives show some promise, they have  
8 not shown sufficient practical promise to cause us to modify  
9 our present instrumentation. This does not close the door on  
10 new parameter research. This is a continuing process.

11       We have shifted to a different model of polygraph in-  
12 strument than the one we were using at the time of the last  
13 hearing, and we feel it is mechanically superior. We are  
14 continuing to evaluate new instrumentation as it becomes  
15 commercially available, and we are continuing our own search  
16 for improved instrumentation.

17       We have developed a computer system which was utilized  
18 heavily in the previously mentioned studies of reliability  
19 and of mathematical modelling of examiner performance. We  
20 were also, naturally, interested in determining the computer  
21 system's practical utility as an additional parameter to  
22 actual polygraph operations. Utilizing all that was learned  
23 during the evolution of our experimental arrangement, we have  
24 full specifications for constructing a dedicated computer system  
25 to assist the examiner in chart interpretation. We are now in

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1 the process of evaluating the cost-effectiveness of the  
2 dedicated computer system.

3 Preliminary efforts have been undertaken in the field  
4 of countermeasures to polygraphy. We have plans for a long-  
5 range systematic program studying the possibilities in this  
6 field, but of course results are not yet available on these  
7 studies.

8 Voice analysis has drawn our attention. We have been  
9 interested in this field for several years, and have been  
10 monitoring research in this area conducted by other institutions.  
11 We do not believe that research to date has been exhaustive or  
12 conclusive and, accordingly, we are planning our own analysis  
13 of its possibilities. This project is still in its developmental  
14 state.

15 That, I believe, would conclude my statement.

16 (The full statement of Mr. Brownman follows:)



1 Mr. Moorhead. Thank you, Mr. Brownman.  
2 The Committee will now go into executive session.  
3 I will ask our guests to leave us.  
4 (Whereupon, at 11:50 a.m., the Subcommittee went  
5 into executive session.)

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SECRET

Executive Registry
10-130

21 February 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

SUBJECT : Polygraph Program

1. The use of the polygraph by the Central Intelligence Agency shall be governed by the provisions of this memorandum. You are hereby directed to take the necessary action to insure implementation.

2. The Director of Security shall be responsible for the supervision and training of polygraph examiners and for the conduct of the polygraph program of the Central Intelligence Agency. He shall insure that the highest standards of operating procedures and equipment capability are established and maintained.

3. The polygraph will be used in the Central Intelligence Agency as an aid to investigation for determining the security eligibility of persons for employment by or assignment to the Agency; security clearance by the Agency; staff-like access to sensitive Agency installations; [REDACTED] situations; or continued access to classified information where implications of a security nature or investigative information require clarifying security interviews.

25X1A

4. The polygraph will not be used in the Central Intelligence Agency on official or administrative matters involving possible malfeasance, or for the sole purpose of determining violations of the criminal laws of any country.

SECRET


Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

5. If a polygraph examination involves a question pertaining to the violation of a criminal law, the individual shall be informed of his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to consult with legal counsel or other professional assistance prior to the examination. Notification of such rights will be formally recorded.

6. The Director of Security shall establish adequate safeguards designed to prevent unwarranted invasion of privacy. Each applicant for employment will be notified, at the time he is given application forms, of the intent to use a polygraph examination in the course of his employment processing. Before a person undergoes a polygraph examination, his consent should be obtained in writing. He should be told, before testing, the general content of all questions which will be asked. He will also be briefed on testing procedures. All questions must have specific relevance to the person being polygraphed and to the purpose of that particular test. Upon inquiry, he should be told if the polygraph examination is being monitored or recorded.

7. The Director of Security shall maintain separate files for information obtained during polygraph examinations. He shall release such information only to appropriate Agency officials when it has a direct bearing on a decision to be made by that official. He shall release polygraph acquired information outside the Agency only after he has made a determination, which is concurred in by the Director or Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, that such a release is necessary in the interest of national security.

25X1A



Richard Helms  
Director



3 MAR 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence  
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence  
SUBJECT: Polygraph Testing

1. I have reviewed the package you sent me on the question of polygraph testing. I would appreciate the following backup information:

a. Of the samples indicated, a large percentage of new applicants were rejected on the basis of polygraph alone. Were the additional forms of investigation, such as interviews with friends, completed or was the applicant rejected on the basis of polygraph before the testing went forward? What did the polygraph show and how did we know it was a clear-cut case for rejection?

60%

b. In the two test cases cited, what was the questioning like? What checks do we have to prevent the questionable and embarrassing interrogation techniques (e.g., questions on sexual behavior) that [REDACTED] alleges were formerly used?

STATINTL

2. Would you give me a simple statement in layman's language summarizing the generally accepted view of the validity of polygraph techniques. What standards do the many agencies that use the polygraph use to measure the reliability of a polygraph test?

STATINTL

[REDACTED]  
STANSFIELD TURNER  
Admiral, U.S. Navy

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STATINTL

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